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THE FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE CHILD LABOR
IN THE LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.
The National Child Labor Bills introduced in Congress are
based on the proposition that Congress has the right to exclude
from interstate commerce the products of a manufacturing or
other establishment where conditions destructive of the health
or inorals of the employees are allowed to exist. The soundness
of this proposition can hardly be seriously questioned in the light
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
There are two views of the power of Congress over inter-
state and foreign commerce. One was enunciated by Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.' In his opinion the power
of Congress over interstate commerce is just as absolute as the
power of the States over intra-state commerce, although it can-
not, any more than any other power of Congress, be so exer-
cised as to violate any of the constitutional restrictions on the
federal power.
"The power over commerce, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost ex-
tent; and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
scribed in the Constitution. * * * These limitations are
expressed in plain terms. * * * If, as has always been
understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to
specific objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States,
is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single
government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on
the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of
the United States."
The theory thus clearly stated by the great Chief Justice
can be illustrated in this way. Suppose Congress passes a bill
prohibiting intertate commerce in a certain article. Such an act
would be a regulation of commerce. The plenary power of -a
sovereign to regulate includes the right of absolute prohibition.
19 Wheaton, I, 196-197 (1824).
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The question of the constitutionality of such an act, therefore,
depends on the answer, not to the question, Is it a regulation of
commerce? but to the question, Does the act violate a constitu-
tional limitation?
There are only two limitations which may restrict the ex-
ercise of the power of Congress to exclude an article from inter-
state commerce. The Fifth Amendment provides that
"No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty.,
or property without due process of law."
It can at least be argued,-with what force it is not necessary
here to decide,-that an act of Congress which prohibited traffic
in an article without express or apparent reason, would deprive
owners of their property "without due process." It may also
be argued that the Ninth Amendment, by providing that
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people,"
prohibits a purely arbitrary exercise of power by Congress; and
that the exclusion without apparent reason of an article from
interstate commerce, would be an arbitrary exercise of power.
It should here be pointed out that under Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall's view, the Tenth Amendment imposes no restriction
on the power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce.
It provides that:
"The powers not delegated to Congress * * * are
reserved to the States."
But the power over interstate commerce and foreign commerce
is expressly delegated to Congress.
The other view of the power of Congress over commerce is,
that besides the express limitations contained in the Constitution,
Congress is prevented from so exercising the power as indirectly
to regulate matters which it cannot regulate directly. It is said
that to allow such regulation would defeat the very purpose of
the Tenth Amendment, which reserved to the States the powers
not granted to Congress nor prohibited to the States.
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Whatever may be said for or against these two views, the
view of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall is today the view of the
Supreme Court. In 1895 Congress passed an act for the sup-
pression of the lottery traffic through national and interstate com-
merce. This act, among other things, makes it an offense to
carry a lottery ticket from one State to another. Its constitu-
tionality was attacked and the two views of Congressional power
just indicated were presented to the Court.2 The majority, tak-
ing the position of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden,8 decided that the act was constitutional. The minority,
adopting the second view, thought the act should be declared
void. Since then the constitutionality of the Federal Pure Food
and Drugs Act and of the White Slave Act have come before the
Court. These decisions also depended upon which of these con-
flicting views the Court would adopt. The Lottery Case was
decided by a divided court, but in the later decisions, Hipolite
Egg Co. v. United States,4 supporting the Pure Food and Drugs
Act, and Hoke v. United States,5 supporting the White Slave
Act, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view was followed with the
concurrence of every member of the Court.
At the present time, therefore, the members of our highest
Court apparently believe that in determining whether Congress
has the right to prohibit the interstate transportation of a class
of persons or products, only the express limitations of the Con-
stitution need be considered. For this reason it seems unneces-
sary to bring special arguments to the support of this theory.
One argument, however, deserves special mention. A State has
the undoubted right to prohibit the manufacture of adulterated
food or drugs within its domain; it can also forbid their impor-
tation from other States." A State has the right to forbid the
sale of lottery tickets, both parties to the sale being within its
borders; it could probably prevent their importation under the
reasoning in the Plumley Case. A State has the right to pre-
2The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
' Supra, n. I.
4220 U. S. 45 (1911).
o227 U. S. 308 (I912).
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894).
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vent the physical and moral degeneration of children by over-
work in manufacturing establishments; but it cannot forbid the
article manufactured by child-exploitation from being introduced
into the State so long as the article itself is unadulterated and
safe.7 In other words, while the States can protect their manu-
facturers from the competition of the makers of adulterated
foods, they are powerless to exclude the competition of foreign
makers who cheapen their product by the exploitation of child
labor. Should Congress lend its aid to the States which protect
their child resources, it would therefore be helping them in a field
in which they cannot help themselves; whereas in the Food and
Drugs Act, Congress enacted federal legislation, not because it
was the only protection open to the States, but because it was
doubtless the best protection possible.
It would indeed be a serious indictment against the wisdom
of the framers of our Constitution to say that they took away
from the States the right to protect their own manufacturers from
unfair trade practices carried on by competitors in other States,
and yet failed to give Congress the power thus taken from the
States. For it is unfair competition for a manufacturer to ex-
ploit child labor to lessen the cost of production when his com-
petitor in another State is either forbidden by law or unwilling
to stoop to such practices. Fortunately the framers of the Con-
stitution did not so limit the power of Congress. They have
conferred on Congress all the power over interstate and foreign
commerce taken from the States. What better exercise of the
right of regulation thus conferred could there be than the pro-
tection of those engaged in industry from unfair competition?
It has been argued that a law prohibiting the products of
exploited, or what we may also call anti-social child labor, from
interstate commerce, interferes with the rights of the States, in
that it indirectly compels employers of labor to conform to the
minimum standards of the Congressional Act or go out of bus-
iness. Admit that this proposed Act would compel practically all
employers of labor to conform to its standards. Is it not better
to do this than to have those States which wish to pass laws to
'I Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. I00 (1889); Schollenberger v. Pennsylva-
nia, 171 U. S. 1 (1898).
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protect their children practically forced to do so at the expense
of subjecting their manufacturers to the unfair competition of
the manufacturers in those States which permit the industrial
exploitation of their children?
As stated, however, the argument is a work of supereroga-
tion, the question of the power of Congress has already been
practically determined by the decisions of the Supreme Court.
It has, indeed, been argued that there is a difference between an
act which excludes the product of exploited child labor from
interstate commerce, and one that excludes lottery tickets,
poisonous drugs, or adulterated foods; that these last are not
legitimate articles of commerce, while the products of exploited
child labor are nevertheless legitimate articles of commerce. To
those who make this argument the following quotation from the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Hoke v. United States,8 is sig-
nificant. The Court, speaking of the power to regulate com-
merce, said:
"The power is direct; there is no word of limitation in
it, and its broad and universal scope has been so often declared
-as to make repetition unnecessary. And besides, it has so
much illustration by cases that it would seem as if there could
be no instance of its exercise that'does not find an admitted ex-
ample in some one of them. Experience, however, is the other
way, and in almost every instance of the exercise of the power
differences are asserted from previous exercises of it and make
a ground of attack."
And so in this case. The differences indicated will be pointed
out and magnified. But if it is a reasonable exercise of the power
to protect the morals or health of the citizens of a State by ex-
cluding from interstate commerce lottery tickets, or poisonous
drugs we may be sure that the Supreme Court will also hold
that it is a reasonable exercise of the power to protect the manu-
facturers of a State from unfair trade competition, by exclud-
ing from interstate commerce the products of those who would
undersell by the exploitation of child labor.
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